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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision in the Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento
Integral v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción case1 [hereinafter
Pemex] is the first US federal appellate decision to confirm a foreign
Convention award that has been set aside at the seat. This issue of
how to treat an arbitral award that has been annulled at the seat is one
which most countries that are party to the New York and/or Panama
Conventions also face. Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion and analysis in Pemex should be of interest not only to courts
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1. Corporacion Mexicana de Mant. v. Pemex-Exploracion, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016)
[hereinafter Pemex II].
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in the United States, but also to courts in other countries that are
parties to these Conventions.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
AWARDS SET ASIDE AT THE SEAT
Although the New York and Panama Conventions compel
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, they also provide for
certain exceptions. Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention2 is
one of the grounds on which recognition and enforcement “may be
refused” at the request of the party against whom it is invoked. The
language of the New York Convention states that “the award has not
yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.”3 However, as underscored by the
permissive language, the Conventions do not appear to impose any
obligation to refuse recognition or enforcement to an annulled award.
Thus, the Conventions themselves seem to leave a country free to
enforce an award set aside in the country where the award was
rendered.
Broadly speaking, courts faced with an award that has been set
aside at the seat take one of three approaches: (1) treat the award as a
nullity, with the result that there is nothing to enforce; (2) effectively
ignore the set-aside, on the view that courts in each Convention
country can make an independent decision about the validity of the
award under its own standards; or (3) give some degree of deference
to the set-aside decision, while reserving the ability to enforce the
award notwithstanding the set-aside if justified under the
circumstances.
A country that treats an award set aside at the seat as no award at
all—because it finds nothing to recognize or enforce—views
arbitration as an extension of the legal regime of the country in which
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 6,
1958 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention], art. V(1)(e).
Article 5(1)(e) in the Panama Convention has a similar ground. See Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama City, 1975) [hereinafter The
Panama Convention], art. 5(1)(e).
3. The Panama Convention has similar language: “The decision is not yet binding on the
parties or has been annulled or suspended by a competent authority of the State in which, or
according to the law of which, the decision has been made.” The Panama Convention, supra
note 2, at art. 5(1)(e).
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the arbitration takes place. Thus, it is appropriate that the potential
enforcing court cede to the court at the place of arbitration complete
oversight and conclusive control over the award.4 Because the parties
have consciously chosen to arbitrate at that particular place, the
parties can be said to expect exposure to a potential set-aside by the
courts of that jurisdiction. Many countries—including Russia, Chile,
Germany, and other (predominantly civil law) jurisdictions—have
adopted this approach.5
A few countries, most notably France, take a diametrically
opposed view. French arbitration law, in both its prior and present
version, eliminates the Article V(1)(e) ground in the New York
Convention as a basis for non-recognition.6 The French view is that
international arbitration is part of a transnational legal order and is not
attached to any national legal regime. Thus, an award annulled at the
seat of arbitration may still be fully enforceable in France, barring any
other Convention ground justifying non-enforcement as a matter of
French domestic law. Of course, the refusal to give effect to a setaside does not mean that France necessarily enforces all awards. For
example, in the Thai-Lao Co. v. Government of Laos case,7 the Paris
Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award set aside at the seat in
Malaysia, but did so on the basis of its own independent review of the
award under French law, invoking the ground of “excess of
jurisdiction,” which is a basis for non-recognition under French law.
4. Especially in the US literature, the seat is often referred to as the “primary
jurisdiction,” while any jurisdiction in which recognition and enforcement is sought is called a
“secondary jurisdiction.” See generally Alan Scott Rau, Understanding (and
Misunderstanding) “Primary Jurisdiction”, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 47 (2010).
5. In some of these countries, there may be alternative mechanisms for enforcing the
award. Under Article VII of the New York Convention, courts may nonetheless find
alternative mechanisms to enforce the award. Article VII of the New York Convention permits
parties to rely on laws or treaties in the enforcing court that would permit recognition or
enforcement of the award on terms more favorable than what is required by the Convention.
See New York Convention, supra note 2. For example, for countries party to the 1961
European Convention, Article IX(1) provides that a decision setting aside an award at the seat
“shall only constitute a ground for the refusal of recognition” if the set-aside was based on the
specific grounds enumerated in Articles V(1)(a)–(d), with the effect of excluding nonarbitrability or public policy under the law at the seat as reasons for refusing recognition and
enforcement. See European Convention, art. IX(1); see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 3623 (2d ed. 2014).
6. CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 1525, 1520 (Fr.). An English translation of
the
law
is
available
at:
http://www.iaiparis.com/pdf/FRENCH_LAW_ON_
ARBITRATION.pdf.
7. See Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 227 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing Paris Court of Appeal decision).
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Among the most undesirable consequences of the French approach of
disregarding annulment at the seat is that it can lead to inconsistent
awards. The reason for the inconsistency is that a second award may
be issued by a tribunal at the seat of arbitration subsequent to the
annulment, as was the case in both the Hilmarton and in Putrabali
cases.8
As for the United States, courts have taken something of a
middle path, appearing to follow a more discretionary approach in
assessing whether to enforce an annulled award. However, it has been
difficult to identify with any precision the standard that the courts in
the United States have adopted. In Baker Marine v. Chevron, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that it would enforce
an annulled award only if there were “adequate reasons for refusing to
recognize the set-aside judgments of the Nigerian court” and
concluded that this was not the case on the facts before it.9 In
TermoRio v. Electranta, the Court of Appeals for the District Court of
Columbia appeared to set a higher threshold in refusing to enforce a
Colombian award set aside in Colombia.10 The ground for the setaside was that the arbitration clause selecting ICC Rules was a
violation of Colombian law. Stating that a foreign set-aside judgment
should be respected unless it was “repugnant to fundamental notions
of what is decent and just in the state where enforcement is sought,”
the court indicated that United States courts should not go behind a
foreign court’s nullification of an award “absent extraordinary
circumstances” and emphasized the narrowness of any “public
policy” exception.11 The D.C. Court of Appeals distinguished an
earlier D.C. district court case, Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab
Republic of Egypt,12 which enforced an award that had been set aside

8. Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation [Cass. 1e
civ.] June 10, 1997, Revue de l’Arbitrage 376 (1997) (Fr.); PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Rena
Holding, Ltd., Cour de Cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] June 29, 2007, XXXII Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 299, 302 (2007).
9. Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1999).
10. TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
11. Id. at 937-38. It is worth noting that the relationship between the “adequate reason”
test and the “extraordinary circumstances” test is not entirely clear. TermoRio states that Baker
Marine is “consistent with” the extraordinary circumstances approach. Id. at 938. However, on
its face the language in Baker Marine would seem to suggest a lower threshold for enforcing
an award that has been set aside at the seat.
12. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C.
1996).
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at the seat, as one in which the defendant Egypt had breached its
agreement not to file an appeal to nullify the award.
III. PEMEX: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE UNITED STATES?
In Pemex, the district court enforced an arbitral award in favor of
COMMISA—a Mexican subsidiary of KBR, a US corporation—
against the Mexican-state owned petroleum company Pemex, even
though the award had been set aside by a court at the Mexican seat.13
The underlying dispute arose when contractual disagreements led to
Pemex seizing oil platforms that COMMISA had been working on,
and then administratively rescinding the contracts Pemex had with
COMMISA. COMMISA brought an ICC arbitration in December of
2004. Pemex participated in the arbitration but challenged the
tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that the rescission constituted an “act
of authority” and was therefore not arbitrable. The tribunal rejected
the argument. In 2009—prior to the rendering of the award14—
Section 98 of the Law of Public Works and Related Services came
into effect, which provided that rescissions of government contracts
“may not be subject to arbitration proceedings.”15 Exclusive
jurisdiction was vested in the administrative courts of Mexico, and
any judicial adjudication of public contract disputes was changed
from 10 years to 45 days. The tribunal issued its award, finding
Pemex liable and awarding COMMISA approximately US$300
million in damages. One arbitrator dissented on the ground that
Section 98 of the Mexican law barred the action.16
Shortly thereafter, COMMISA sought to confirm the award
under the Panama Convention in the New York federal district court.
Pemex moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and also
moved to set aside the award in Mexico and to stay the New York
proceedings. The federal district court denied the stay and confirmed
13. Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S.De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex
Exploracion Y Produccion, 962 F.Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Pemex I].
14. The award was rendered on December 19, 2009; the legislation came into effect on
May 28, 2009. See Pemex I, supra note 13, at 648. There is usually an interval of several
months between the close of the hearings and the issuance of the award, so it is not clear
whether or to what extent the new law was addressed during the course of the hearings.
15. See Law of Public Works and Related Services, § 98 (Mex.) (effective May 28,
2009).
16. Pemex I, supra note 13, at 648. The dissenting arbitrator also argued that res judicata
barred the action in light of a related amparo proceeding, but the res judicata issue was not
taken up by the US court. Id.
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the award in August 2010. While the case was on appeal to the
Second Circuit, the Mexican court (the Eleventh Collegiate Court)
annulled the award on the ground that arbitration of the dispute was
non-arbitrable and against Mexican public policy. The Mexican court
relied not only on the new law (Section 98), but also on a 1994
judgment of the Mexican Supreme Court that discussed
administrative rescission of contracts, but without any reference to
arbitration or arbitrability. On the basis of the set-aside, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case in order that the district
court could reconsider its decision in light of the Mexican set-aside.
On remand, the district court again confirmed the award,
“declin[ing] to defer to the Eleventh Collegiate Court’s ruling.”17 Its
judgment was based on the conclusion that the Mexican court setaside judgment violated basic notions of justice by applying a
retroactive prohibition on arbitrability and leaving the plaintiff with
no remedy.18 Key to the district court’s ruling was a determination
that the Eleventh Collegiate Court—despite that Court’s statements
directly to the contrary—did not actually reach the result it did based
solely on the 1994 judgment, but that it had instead relied on Section
98.19 Particularly troubling to the court was the fact that Section 98
established a 45-day time limitations period for filing claims
regarding administrative rescission in the designated court, which
meant that the period in which COMMISA could file a claim had
already elapsed by the time the Eleventh Collegiate Court judgment
came down.20
Pemex appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court in an opinion that conceivably
adopts a new framework for recognition of an arbitral award in the
aftermath of a set-aside. 21 Rather than starting with the earlier
standard espoused in Baker Marine—that enforcement of a set-aside
award is inappropriate absent an “adequate reason”—or the
potentially stricter “extraordinary circumstances” formulation from
TermoRio, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit framed its
17. Id. at 644.
18. Id. at 657.
19. Id. at 659 (“Based on the Eleventh Collegiate Court’s extensive discussion of Section
98, it was this law, not the 1994 Mexican Supreme Court decision, that was critical to its
decision.”).
20. Id. at 652. The limitations period ran from the date of the rescission, in 2004.
21. Pemex II, supra note 1.
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discussion around the concept of comity, with specific reference to
the law on recognition of judgments. It began by describing the
district court decision to enforce the award despite the set-aside as a
“denial of comity” to the Mexican judgment—a formulation that the
district court had never itself used.22 Nonetheless, it affirmed the
district court’s confirmation of the award. Citing a series of cases
from the judgment recognition context, the Court of Appeals stated
that foreign judgments are “generally conclusive”—as a matter of
comity—except where recognition and enforcement “would offend
the public policy of the state in which enforcement is sought.”23 The
Court of Appeals drew particularly heavily from Ackermann v.
Levine, a case decided under New York’s version of the Uniform
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act.24 Indeed, in the
single paragraph devoted to the content of the public policy standard
itself, the court simply distilled a key passage from Ackermann as
follows:
The public policy exception does not swallow the rule: the
standard is high, and infrequently met; a judgment that tends
clearly to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in
the administration of the law, or security for individual rights of
personal liberty or of private property is against public policy.
The exception accommodates uneasily two competing (and
equally important) principles: [i] the goals of comity and res
judicata that underlie the doctrine of recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments and [ii] fairness to litigants.25

Notwithstanding that it relied primarily on cases from the
judgment recognition context, the Court of Appeals stated that
TermoRio and Baker Marine “endorsed this approach.”26 That
statement may be somewhat of a reach. Baker Marine never cited to
any judgment recognition cases, although it did say that there were

22. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 100.
23. Id. at 105–06 (citing Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109
F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1986); and
Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971)).
24. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986). Notably, the practice
commentaries to the UFCMJRA as incorporated into the CPLR state, “Article 53 only
incorporates a portion of New York’s comity case law into statute: specifically, that involving
money judgments.” N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5301 (McKinney 2017), C5301:1. Recognition of Foreign
Country Money Judgments, Generally (Richard C. Reilly, ed.) (emphasis in original).
25. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 106, (quoting Ackermann, supra note 24, at 841-42).
26. Id.
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“no adequate reasons for refusing to recognize the judgments of the
Nigeria court,” and it mentioned “public policy” only in passing in a
footnote. TermoRio, which did engage in a more fulsome discussion
of public policy, disclaimed that US courts have “unfettered
discretion to impose [their] own considerations of public policy.”27
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s application of public policy to
the facts of the case is not particularly illuminating. The Court of
Appeals cited four considerations in support of its conclusion that the
set-aside judgment by the Mexican court contravened US public
policy: (1) that it violates a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity;
(2) that it amounts to retroactive application of the law which
disrupted contractual undertakings; (3) that it deprives COMMISA of
a forum; and (4) that it amounts to government expropriation without
compensation.28 Each of these factors merits further inquiry. The
concern about violating the contractual immunity waiver and the
reference to expropriation without compensation in particular raise
questions. The first suggests that courts at the seat may not review
whether an arbitral tribunal properly exercised jurisdiction over the
dispute, which is surely not the case. The concern about expropriation
looked to the US Constitution’s “Takings” doctrine and to NAFTA’s
provision on expropriation, but there is no discussion of how these
sources, as applied to the enforcement of the award in this case,
would violate U.S. public policy.
The second and third grounds are stronger, but they too raise
questions. First, it is an open issue as to whether an enforcing court
should review a foreign set-aside judgment for substantive as well as
procedural defects. And even assuming substantive concerns are an
appropriate subject of inquiry, retroactive legislation is not always
prohibited or against public policy—even in the United States—
although it is certainly “disfavored.”29 Second, comity might suggest
27. TermoRio, supra note 10, at 251–52.
28. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 107–11.
29. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“[T]he presumption
against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal
doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”). Yet it is important to note that the presumption
against retroactive legislation is a rule of statutory interpretation: Congress may be able to pass
a retroactive law—subject to certain constitutional questions about retroactive legislation—but
it must indicate clearly that the law is to have retroactive effect. In the Pemex dispute, Section
98 “did not address whether it applied to administrative rescissions that were issued prior to its
enactment.” Pemex I, supra note 13, at 648. Of course, even if Section 98’s silence regarding
retroactive application means a US court would apply the Landgraf presumption—and even if
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that an enforcing court should not be second-guessing a foreign court
on the determination of its own law. Although TermoRio stated that a
“narrow public policy gloss on Article V(1)(e)” could provide for
enforcement of set-aside awards, nonetheless it noted various limits to
US courts’ invocation of public policy; it specifically disclaimed that
“a court in the United States has unfettered discretion to impose its
own considerations of public policy” especially where that involves
“reviewing . . . the foreign court’s construction of the law of the
[seat].”30 In the district court decision in Pemex, Judge Hellerstein
also signaled his awareness of the need for caution in engaging in
substantive review of foreign judgments when he wrote: “In declining
to defer to the Eleventh Collegiate Court, I am neither deciding, nor
reviewing, Mexican law. I base my decision not on the substantive
merit of a particular Mexican law, but on its application to events that
occurred before that law’s adoption.”31 Nonetheless, it is clear that
that the district court did make its own determination about the actual
ground for the Mexican court’s set-aside decision that contradicted
the ground on which the Mexican court purported to base its
decision.32 Whatever the merits of the district court’s conclusion, its
disagreement with the foreign court’s reasoning does raise sensitive
issues of international comity. In a somewhat different context, the
Second Circuit recently invoked comity and refused to looking behind
the law of a foreign state to inquire into motive or reasoning.33 In
Pemex, however, the Second Circuit appeared to agree with the
district court’s determination that the Mexican court had not
genuinely relied on the 1994 Mexican judgment and had instead

that presumption reflects public policy—it is another matter altogether to say that a foreign
judgment setting aside an award violates US public policy for failing to apply that same
statutory presumption.
30. TermoRio, supra note 10, at 251–52.
31. Pemex I, supra note 13, at 661.
32. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
33. In In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), the defendants
(Chinese corporations) formed a cartel to fix the price of vitamin C exported to the United
States in violation of US antitrust law. Rather than deny the allegations, defendants argued that
Chinese law required them to coordinate export prices. Despite evidence that the defendants
had specifically asked the Chinese government to fix their prices, perhaps in a move to avoid
liability in the United States, the Second Circuit credited the defense and dismissed the case on
the ground of international comity. The case is noteworthy because it marked the first time a
ministry of the Chinese government appeared in a US proceeding as amicus curiae. See id. at
180, n.5.

808

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:3

based its decision on § 98,34 stating “we do not think that the Southern
District second-guessed the Eleventh Collegiate Court, which appears
only to have been implementing the law of Mexico.”35 Finally, the
concern about lack of access to any other forum for resolution of the
dispute may be the most compelling reason the Court offered to
justify ignoring the set-aside. Pemex’s response was that COMMISA
had been told early on to bring an action in the Mexican courts to
challenge the rescission, and thus the lack of remedy was the result of
its own strategic choice.
An even more troubling aspect of the Second Circuit’s decision
in Pemex is its use of an “abuse of discretion” standard for review of
the district court judgment. The court stated that the “unfettered
discretion of a district court to enforce an arbitral award annulled in
the awarding jurisdiction” was “constrained” only by “international
comity.”36 Despite the fact that neither appellate court in TermoRio or
Baker Marine used an abuse of discretion standard, the Court of
Appeals in Pemex devoted no analysis to this point. The district court
in Pemex properly viewed TermoRio and Baker Marine as holding
that a court has only “narrow discretion” to confirm an award that has
been set aside by a competent court.37 But that discretion is the
34. See Pemex II, supra note 1, at 109 (“One of PEP’s own witnesses, in the evidentiary
hearing before the Southern District, testified that the 1994 decision was a ‘weak premise’ for
the Eleventh Collegiate Court to rely upon. . . . It is therefore unsurprising that the opinion of
the Eleventh Collegiate Court relies heavily on Section 98 and very little on the Mexican
Supreme Court decision.”).
35. Id. at 111. The claim that the district court did not second guess the Eleventh
Collegiate Court is not entirely convincing. The district court said, “it was [§ 98], not the 1994
Mexican Supreme Court decision, that was critical to [the Eleventh Collegiate Court’s]
decision.” Pemex I, supra note 13, at 659. However, the Eleventh Collegiate Court purportedly
relied at least in part on case law that predated Section 98. Thus, the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that the US enforcement decision did not contradict the Mexican set-aside decision
on what was effectively a point of Mexican law is not illuminating. Perhaps it would have
been preferable for the Court of Appeals to directly confront the question of when the
deference typically owed to a court at the seat when interpreting its own law is outweighed by
other considerations.
36. Id. at 106. Interestingly, as authority for the proposition that “we review a district
court’s decision to extend or deny comity to a foreign proceeding for abuse of discretion,”
Pemex cited Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999), a
case that involved dismissing a US debt collection suit in favor of a Brazilian bankruptcy
proceeding, in which the US defendant’s assets were being liquidated, on the grounds of
international comity.
37. Pemex I, supra note 13, at 657. (The district court referenced Article 5 of the Panama
Convention, as implemented by the FAA [Chapter 3] and stated: “The statutory phrase, ‘may,’
gives me discretion but, it appears from [TermoRio and Baker Marine], a narrow discretion.”).
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discretion provided by the “may refuse” language of the New York
and Panama Conventions and refers to the discretion that a country
has in determining how to deal with a set-aside. It does not and should
not address the allocation of decision-making between the district and
appellate court. Similarly, “abuse of discretion” is not the applicable
standard of review of a lower court’s ruling in the context of
judgment recognition, which is generally said to be “de novo.”38 Use
of “de novo” review is necessary to develop consistent standards in an
area that requires predictability and uniformity.
Nonetheless, the adoption by the Court of Appeals in Pemex of a
“judgments framework” as the means to evaluate a set-aside is
desirable and provides criteria and guidance for such assessments.39 A
similar standard for treating set-asides has been articulated in the
2012 Draft of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law
Third on International Commercial Arbitration: Section 4-16(b) of the
Draft provides that a court in the United States may confirm,
recognize, or enforce an award that has been set aside by a competent
authority “if the judgment setting it aside is not entitled to recognition
under the principles governing the recognition of judgments in the
court where such relief is sought, or in other extraordinary
circumstances.”40
A few courts elsewhere appear to have engaged in a similar
analysis. In the Yukos Capital Sarl v. Rosneft case,41 the Amsterdam
Court of Appeal enforced an award that was set aside by the Russian
38. DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486, 195 L. Ed. 2d 822 (2016) (“Whether the judgment debtor established
that one of these non-recognition provisions applies is a question of law reviewed de novo.”).
DeJoria, in which recognition was sought under Texas’s Uniform Foreign Country Money–
Judgment Recognition Act, noted that it used de novo review because that was the standard
under state law. Although not entirely analogous, the Second Circuit has employed de novo
review when a lower court grants summary judgment on a judgment recognition question.
SerVaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 540 F. App’x 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2013). The same standard of
review should be applied in the award recognition context.
39. See generally Linda Silberman & Maxi Scherer, Forum Shopping and Post-Award
Judgments, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
CONTEXT 313–45 (Franco Ferrari, ed., 2013). See also William W. Park, Duty and Discretion
in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. OF INT. L. 805 (1999); Linda J. Silberman, The New
York Convention After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the Role of National Law, 38 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 25, 32–36 (2009).
40. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third), The U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration, Tentative Draft No. 2 § 4-16 (Apr. 16, 2012).
41. Yukos Capital Sarl v. OAO Rosneft, Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Apr. 28, 2009
(Neth.), XXXIV Y.B. COMM. ARB. 703 (2009).
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courts, concluding that the Russian set-aside was a foreign judgment
rendered by a judicial body that lacked impartiality and independence
and thus should not be recognized. The Dutch Yukos case was
probably an “easy” case for a “judgments approach” because the need
for impartial tribunals and fairness of proceedings is a universal
ground for non-recognition of a judgment. “Public policy” is also a
ground for non-recognition of foreign judgments, but that is a more
amorphous standard, and was recognized as such by the Court of
Appeals in Pemex, which cautioned that invocations of public policy
must be limited and therefore require a high hurdle. Although it may
be questioned whether the “public policy” exception should be
limited to “process” defects in the set-aside court, as in Yukos, or can
also include substantive matters such as retroactivity, substantive
standards of “decency and justice” are often invoked in traditional
judgment-recognition cases. Thus, such standards, along with
acceptable practices in international arbitration, can and should
properly inform public policy in this context.
One need not go as far as the late Professor Hans Smit, who
proposed that all annulments be presumptively disregarded in cases
where the set-aside had taken place in the “home court” of one of the
parties, and at its request,42 but concerns about local bias and
parochialism at the situs cannot be entirely disregarded where a stateowned entity is involved and that state was the only realistic place of
arbitration. The late Andreas Lowenfeld, Professor Silberman’s
colleague at NYU, thought set-asides should not be respected if they
were “fishy.” In our view, “fishy” is not a legal standard that one that
can define or legitimately invoke, and although the “judgments
approach” has its limitations, it is a substantial improvement over
“fishy” or mere “discretion.”
Further word on the propriety of a “judgments approach” will
have to await another case. Although Pemex filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court challenging both the standard applied
by the Second Circuit and what it characterized as the US court’s
inappropriate inquiry into the Mexican set-aside decision, the case
ultimately settled.43 It is worth keeping an eye on another set42. See Hans Smit, Annulment and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: A
Practical Perspective, 18 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 297, 304 (2007).
43. KBR Resolves Decade Long Despite in Mexico, OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY (10
April 2017), available at http://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/kbr-resolves-decade-longdispute-in-mexico-collects-435-million/. The petition for certiorari also raised two additional

2017]

RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT AFTER PEMEX

811

aside/recognition case pending in the Second Circuit. In Thai-Lao
Lignite v. the Government of Laos, a district court in New York
refused to enforce an award in favor of a Thai company against the
Government of Laos after it had been set aside by a court seated in
Malaysia.44 Thai-Lao has a peculiar twist because the district court
had previously confirmed the award—a decision that was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.45 After the confirmation
action in the United States, the Government of Laos successfully
challenged the award in Malaysia. The ground for the set-aside in
Malaysia was that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by
extending the agreement to reach non-parties and claims related to
other contracts. The Government of Laos filed to have the case reopened in light of the set-aside,46 and by the time the district court
issued its decision, the district decision in Pemex had just been
rendered. In distinguishing Thai-Lao from Pemex, the district judge
pointed out that the set-aside judgment in Thai-Lao was in a neutral
country and did not involve any entity of the State of the seat. It is
also the case that the ground for set-aside in Malaysia was the
equivalent of a New York Convention defense whereas the ground in
Mexico was arguably a “local” arbitrability issue favorable to the
state entity. Finally, unlike in Pemex, the Malaysian High Court

points. First, Pemex challenged the augmentation of the award at the enforcement stage by the
district court and the Second Circuit by ordering Pemex to pay COMMISA US$
106 million over what the arbitrators awarded, as compensation for performance bonds
Pemex collected after the award issued. Second, Pemex argued that the district court had no
personal jurisdiction over it and thus could not entertain an action to confirm the award. The
Court of Appeals did not expressly address the question of whether §1605(a)(6) the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), which provides an exception for immunity where “the
agreement or award is (or may be) governed by a treaty or international agreement in force for
the United States which calls for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,” also
provides a constitutional basis for jurisdiction. The panel majority held that when Pemex
sought remand for reconsideration in light of the set aside, it forfeited its personal jurisdiction
defense, despite timely raising, fully briefing and arguing the point. Pemex II, supra note 1, at
101. One judge dissented on the “forfeiture” point. In any event, the full panel agreed that
Pemex, although formally a foreign corporation, was to be treated as the foreign sovereign
itself and thus was not entitled to Due Process protection. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 102–03.
44. See Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
45. Thai–Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 2011 WL 3516154, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011) (Wood, J.), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 150
(2d. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1473 (Feb. 21, 2013).
46. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
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decision did not leave the losing party without a remedy, as it merely
ordered re-arbitration before a different panel of arbitrators.47
IV. CONCLUSION
The Pemex case may have signaled a new approach for the
United States to the recognition of awards that have been set aside at
the seat. The move toward a judgments approach is a welcome
development in providing a framework by which to evaluate the setaside of a foreign Convention award. However, the Pemex opinion is
not entirely satisfactory. To the extent a court will engage in review
of both substantive and procedural defects in the foreign set-aside
judgment, comity would seem to require some deference to the
foreign judgment when the foreign court is interpreting its own law. It
is unclear whether the Second Circuit provided that deference in the
instant case. Also, the invocation of an “abuse of discretion” standard
to review the district court’s ruling to disregard the foreign set-aside
seems wrong and threatens to undermine uniformity and consistency
at the recognition stage and potentially erodes the supervisory
authority of courts at the seat. The need for some inquiry into the
basis of the foreign set-aside does seem appropriate, but further
development of the issues we have raised will nonetheless be
necessary to make that approach effective and acceptable.

47. See Thai-Lao, supra note 44, at 227.

